“If defendant is not sentenced before his inauguration, there is also no legal barrier to deferring that sentencing until after the end of his presidency. CPL § 380.30(1) requires the Court to pronounce sentence ‘without unreasonable delay,’ and a failure to do so ‘results in a loss of jurisdiction over the defendant.’ However, ‘the passage of time standing alone does not bar imposition of sentence or require a defendant’s discharge.’ Rather, it is only ‘inexcusable delay that does so.'”
“But if the delay ‘is caused by legal proceedings… it is excusable.’ Even ‘relatively long delays occasioned by the State have been excused for good cause.’ Similarly, courts have assumed that the ‘Sixth Amendment guarantee to a speedy trial applies to sentencing.’ Like the CPL § 380.30(1) analysis, the speedy trial right requires a ‘court to determine whether [a] delay’ in sentencing ‘has been unreasonable in light of the peculiar circumstances of the case.’ Under those well-settled standards, an adjournment that resulted in sentencing being held after the end of defendant’s presidential term would be reasonable. Courts routinely approve of years long delays in sentencings when the delay is attributable to the defendant’s own conduct, or when it is attributable to factors outside of the People or the Court’s control,” writes Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg’s team in a motion opposing convicted felon President-Elect Trump’s bid to have his conviction tossed.